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Abstract
We discuss philosophical issues concerning the
notion of cognition basing ourselves in experimental
results in cognitive sciences, especially in computer
simulations of cognitive systems. There have been
debates on the “proper” approach for studying
cognition, but we have realized that all approaches
can be in theory equivalent. Different approaches
model different properties of cognitive systems from
different perspectives, so we can only learn from all
of them. We also integrate ideas from several
perspectives for enhancing the notion of cognition,
such that it can contain other definitions of cognition
as special cases. This allows us to propose a simple
classification of different types of cognition.
1. Introduction
When we try to decide wether a system is cognitive, we fall
into similar problems as the ones we find when deciding
wether a system is intelligent, or alive. The notion of cognition
has been used in so many different contexts and with so many
different goals, that there are several particular definitions, but
no general one. We will not try to give a definition of
cognition, but we will try to broaden the notion of cognition
attempting to enhance our understanding of it.
Etymologically, the word ‘cognition’ comes from the
Latin cognoscere , which means ‘get to know’. We can say that
cognition consists in the acquisition of knowledge. Therefore,
we can say that a system is cognitive if it knows something.
Humans are cognitive systems because they know how to
communicate, build houses, etc. Animals are cognitive systems
because they know how to survive. Autonomous robots are
cognitive systems if they know how to perform certain tasks.
Does a tree know when spring comes because it blossoms? We
should  better slow down, and first take a look at different
approaches for studying cognition.
In classical cognitive science and artificial intelligence
(e.g. Newell and Simon, 1972; Newell, 1990; Shortliffe, 1976;
Fodor, 1976; Pylyshyn, 1984; Lenat and Feigenbaum, 1992),
people described  cognitive systems as symbol systems
(Newell, 1980). However, it seemed to become a consensus in
the community that if a system did not used symbols or rules,
it would not be cognitive. From this perspective, animals are
not cognitive systems because they do not use and have
symbols. Nevertheless, if we open a human brain, we will not
find any symbol either. Opposing the symbolic paradigm, the
connectionist approach was developed (Rumelhart, et al.,
1986; McClelland, et al., 1986), assuming that cognition
emerges from the interaction of many simple processing units
or neurons. To our knowledge, there has been no claim that
“therefore a cognitive system should be able to perform
parallel distributed processes, otherwise it is not cognitive”.
Still, there has been a long discussion on which paradigm is
the “proper” one for studying cognition (Smolensky, 1988;
Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988). The behaviour-based paradigm
(Brooks, 1986; 1991; Maes, 1994) was developed  also
opposing the symbolic views, and not entirely different from
the connectionist. There have been also o ther approaches to
study cognition (e.g. Braitenberg, 1984;Maturana and Varela,
1987; Beer, 2000; Gärdenfors, 2000).
We support the idea that there is no single “proper” theory
of cognition, but different theories that study cognition from
different <perspectives|contexts> and with different goals.
Moreover, we argue that in theory  any cognitive system can be
modelled to an arbitrary degree of precision by most of the
accepted theories, but none can do this completely (precisely
because they are models). We believe that we will have a less-
incomplete understanding of cognition if we use all the
theories available rather than trying to explain every aspect of
cognition from a single perspective.
In the following section, we compare different approaches
used for studying cognition, which leads us to discuss issues
about modelling in general in Section 3. In Section 4 we try to
broaden the notion of cognition in order to propose one valid
in as many contexts as possible. In Section 5 we propose a
simple classification of different types of cognition, for then
drawing concluding remarks.
2. Different Approaches to Cognition: Which
One is the Best?
Different approaches used to study cognition can model the
same cognitive processes with different complexities, because
they make different abstractions, and they have different goals.
All of them are simplifying. Symbol systems do not look at
subtleties of biological brains; neural networks do not
contemplate different types of neurons, particular topologies;
neurophysiology can be accused of simplifying molecular
interactions, etc. But simplification is a feature of science: we
need to ignore details in order to understand phenomena at a
particular level. Because of this, we cannot say that any
approach is invalid because it simplifies the object of study,
since all approaches simplify cognitive processes. Different
approaches help us understand different aspects of cognition.
Hence, we cannot say that any paradigm is “better” than any
other in general, only in particular contexts.
Experimental results ( e.g. Gärdenfors, 1994; Seth, 1998;
Gershenson, 2002b), indicate that many cognitive processes
have been modelled with the same success (to a certain degree)
from different paradigms, and also that some paradigms can
model the behaviour of other paradigms. We can build a
behaviour-based system or a connectionist network which
controls agents which can be interpreted to be following rules.
But we also can build a rule-based system to mimic the
behaviour of “simple” architectures or animals. Seth (1998)
has shown how can the performance of evolved Braitenberg
(1984) architectures can be interpreted from a behaviourist
perspective. We can describe the reasoning of a chess player
in terms of conditioning, but also the  locomotion of bacteria
towards benign environments in terms of intentionality (Jonker
et al., 2001). Reasoning and behaviour is not something
systems have, but something we describe in them.
For example, a connectionist system cannot be judged
“non-cognitive” because “it does not have rules”. Humans do
not have rules either. It is a useful way of describing our
performance, but we can describe artificial systems in the same
way if it is convenient for us. 
We can observe different artificial systems from different
paradigms as performing the same tasks. Gershenson (2002b)
showed that we can explain the performance of such a system
from a different paradigm. Therefore, we can say that the
cognition of a system is independent of its implementation.
Cognition is rather observed than possessed by a system,
natural or artificial. We describe the cognition of a system, but
no system has cognition as one of its elements.
Of course, there are several differences among different
models from different paradigms. Some models are very easy
to implement in software code (also depending on the
programmer), others not so much, but occasionally it is a
different story if we want to implement an architecture in a real
robot. Moreover, if a model works in a simulation and/or
robot, it does not mean that animals function in the same way.
Some models are very robust, others would  break up quite
easily if faced with an unusual situation (but in any case any
cognitive system is dependent on its environment). Some
models are quite good if we have just practical purposes, if we
want things only to work, and this also depends on the
experience of the engineer. But if we are interested in using
them as explanatory models, the simplicity of their
implementation might be secondary, and sometimes even
undesired. Also, if we would like to increment or enhance the
models, some would need to be redesigned from scratch and
others could be easily extended. Also some models would have
more ease in adapting to changes of their environment than
others, but this does not mean that we cannot adjust different
architectures in order to obtain the desired behaviour.
For example, it is not practical to model language
development with a Braitenberg architecture or to balance a
multi-legged robot using a rule-based system. But these are
different aspects of cognition: humans are cognitive systems
because they can prove theorems and play chess, but also
because they can coordinate their movements in order to
communicate and produce effective behaviours1. Many people
could disagree here, because there are several different uses of
the word cognition. We will try to encompass as much as we
can, rather than limiting our views and understanding.
3. About Models
“Explanations are for ourselves, not for the explained”
We can make a more general distinction between models and
the modelled with the ontological notion of relative being and
absolute being (Gershenson, 2002a). The absolute being (a-
being) is the being which is independent from the observer,
and is for and in the whole universe. Therefore, it is unlimited
and uncomprehensible, although we can approximate it as
much as we want to. The relative being (re-being) is the being
which is for ourselves, and it is different for each cognizer, and
therefore dependent on the observer. It is relative because it
depends on the context where each cognizer is. This context is
different for all cognizers, and even the context of a cognizer
can be changing constantly, with his or her notions of what re-
is. It is limited because cognizers have limits, i.e. they cannot
know an unlimited number of things.
Everything re-is a generalization of what a-is . This is
because things a-have an unlimited number of properties, but
can re-have only a limited number of them, no matter how
huge. Therefore, we need to ignore most of these properties
(e.g. the spins of the electrons while building an aircraft),
making a generalization of what things a-are. However, it
seems that most of the properties contemplated by different
cognizers are the most relevant for their contexts, and there is
1Of course there are different types and degrees of
cognition, but we are interested about cognition in general.
not much inconvenience in ignoring many properties. But we
need to be aware that we will never have a complete
description of what things a-are, because it would have to be
infinite and unlimited.
Different re-beings can generalize an a-being different
properties, which might overlap or not. They can also make
this generalization observing at different abstraction levels.
Re-beings can be seen as metaphors of an a-being. Figure 1
shows a diagram of how cognizers can only abstract limited
parts of an a-being.
Figure 1. Relative beings as approximations of absolute
being.
Returning to models, they can clearly be considered as
special cases of re-beings which try to approximate “the real
thing” (a-being). All models, by definition, are simplifying. It
depends on what we are interested in modelling and how we
justify our simplifications that we can judge the suitability of
a model2.
But there is clearly no “best” model outside a context.
Some could argue that better models are the ones in which
prediction is both maximally accurate and minimally complex.
But this is inside the context of information theory.
Moreover, suppose that we are trying to model a function
of n dimensions. For any such a function, there is an infinite
number of functions of dimension n+1 which determine exactly
the function we try to model. If we compare two or several of
such functions, which one is the “real” one? (Assuming that we
cannot know a priori how many dimensions the function
should have). So, in theory , any approach (a different function)
could model to a desired level of accuracy a natural cognitive
system. In practice different approaches achieve this to
different degrees in different perspectives.
We argue that there is no way of determining which re-
being is better or worse, good or bad. But one thing we can do,
is to distinguish different degrees of incompleteness. All
models are incomplete, but if a model contains several models,
it will be less incomplete than those models. This would be
valid only in the context of <understanding|explaining>,
because in a pragmatic context we would just want a model to
work with less effort. But if we try to contain as much <re-
beings|models|contexts>, as possible, we will encounter fewer
contradict ions ins ide  the  l ess  incomple te  <re-
being|model|context>.
Returning even more, to models and architectures of
cognition, we can say that not only there is no general good
model or architecture. And  we will have a less incomplete
understanding of cognition only if we study it from as many
<perspectives|contexts|paradigms> as possible. Each model is
abstracting different aspects of what cognition a-is: any
cognitive behaviour can be described in terms of rules, parallel
distributed processing, behaviours, mathematics, etc. And now
we can say that all cognitive models are equivalent in the
degree that they model the same aspect of cognition. Some
might be more illuminating than others, and so on.
Nevertheless, they are just different <ways of | perspectives
for> describing the same thing. And this does not mean that
cognition is characterized by rules, behaviours, or whatever.
Things do not depend on the models we have of them .
So, what a-is cognition then?
4. About Cognition
Cognition has been studied from a variety of contexts, such as
philosophy, artificial intelligence, psychology, dynamical
systems theory (Beer, 2000), etc. And it is because of this that
in each context cognition is considered with different eyes, and
considered to be a different thing. So in different contexts we
will be ab le to define cognition as the manipulation of
symbolic representations (Newell, 1990), or as autopoiesis
(Stewart, 1996, based on Maturana and Varela, 1980), or as
the ability to solve a problem (Heylighen, 1990), or as the
ability to adapt to changes in the environment, or as “the art of
getting away with it”3. We can say that cognition re-is a
different thing in different contexts, but can we say what
cognition a-is? No, but we can approach to it as much as we
want to. The way of achieving this is to make our context as
less-incomplete as possible, by containing as many contexts as
possible. Therefore, we will not be able to dismiss a model just
because it is of a certain paradigm, since all paradigms suffer
from limitedness4. We can only learn from any model of
cognition. We cannot say whether a model is right or wrong
outside a context. Of course, less-incomplete models will be
more robust and will be valid in more contexts. For example,
2Webb (2001) has discussed several dimensions in which
we can make models of animal behaviour more or less close to the
modelled: medium, generality, abstraction, level, relevance, structural
accuracy, and behaviour match.
3This phrase is original of A. Frappé, although referring to
intelligence.
4“All ideas are valid in the context they were created”.
we cannot judge internal representations in a neural context
just because these are not <observed |described> at that level.
We will try to reach a broader notion of cognition basing
ourselves on the ideas exposed previously. We can make some
general remarks:
• Systems can be judged to be cognitive only inside a
specific context. For example, in a chess-playing context,
a bee  is not cognitive, but in a navigational context, it is.
People agree in contexts, and these are contrasted with
experience of a shared world, so we are not in danger of
any radical relativism or wild subjectivism.
• Cognition is a description we give of systems, not an
intrinsic constituent of them, i.e. systems do not have
cognition as an element, we observe cognition from a
specific context. The cognition of a system does not
depend on its implementation.
• If a system performs a successful action, we can say that
it knows what to do in that specific situation. This success
is tied to a context and to an observer. Therefore, any
system performing a successful action can be considered
to be a cognitive system. This is a most general notion of
cognition, and other types of cognition and definitions can
be applied in different contexts with different purposes
without contradicting this notion.
So, a tree knows when spring comes because it blossoms,
in a specific context (not common in cognitive science, though
(yet...)). And a protein knows how to become phosphorilized,
and a rock knows how to fall... if we find a context where this
makes sense.
It might seem that we are falling a bit into a language
game. Yes, but we are victims of the same language game when
we speak about human cognition and its limits! We are the
ones who judge that a tree may know when to blossom, and
consider this as knowledge. But this is not different from the
process we make when we judge the knowledge of a human or
a machine. We can describe human problem solving in terms
of behaviour and classical conditioning, but we can also
describe biology in terms of epistemology.
We are not insinuating that atoms and humans have the
same cognitive abilities, there is a  considerable difference in
complexity, but not in the “essential” nature of cognition
(well, the ability to do things “properly” is not entirely
essential, since we judge this properness). (But for example an
oxygen atom knows how to bind itself to two hydrogen atoms,
and humans do not!).
We can measure this complexity5, but we should note that
this can only be relative to an abstraction level (Gershenson,
2002a). And there are many definitions and measures of
complexity, so again there is no “most appropriate” measure
outside a context. Moreover, Kolen and Pollack (1994) have
shown that complexity is dependent on the observer and how
she/he measures a phenomenon.
So, what does cognitive  science should study? We would
suggest that cognition at all levels, not only at the human, in
order to have the broadest notion of cognition. This is not just
out of the hat. People already speak about bacterial (Jonker et
al., 2001), immunological (Hershberg and Efroni, 2001), plant,
animal(Vauclair, 1996; Bekoff, et al., 2002), machine, social,
economical cognitions. What is out of the hat is proteic,
molecular, atomic, planetary, etc. cognitions. Of course all of
this is our interpretation, but if we take “the real thing”, what
cognition a-is, we humans are not different from any other
system. What changes is just how we describe ourselves (and
our complexity. This complexity allows us to identify new
abstraction levels, and this is very important, but at the end we
all are a bunch of molecules, a mass of quarks, and infinitude
of nothings...) “How does the immune system knows which
antigens are foreign of the organism?” is not a question very
different from “How do people know when someone is
lying?”. And research in complex systems (see Bar-Yam
(1997) for an introduction) has shown that systems classically
considered as cognitive can be modelled with the same models
of systems which are classically not considered as cognitive,
and also vice versa.
That we are interpreting cognition does not mean that
there is no objective notion of cognition. What it means is that
it is everywhere, and therefore there is no general way (outside
a specific context) to draw a borderline between “cognition”
and “non-cognition”.
How useful is to describe the behaviour of a particle in
terms of cognition, when physics already describes it with a
different terminology? It is not about usefulness. W e should
just realize that cognition, in essence, a-is the same for all
systems, since it depends on its description. What makes us
different is just the complexity degree and the names we use to
describe our cognition.
5. Different Types of Cognition
We can quickly begin to identify different types of cognition,
and this will relate the ideas just presented with previous
approaches for studying cognition. This does not attempt to be
a complete or final categorization, but it should help in
understanding our ideas.
We can say that classical cognitive science studies human
cognition. Of course many disciplines are involved in the
study of human cognition, such as neuroscience, psychology,
philosophy, classical A. I., etc. Human cognition can be seen
as a subset of animal cognition, which has been studied by
ethologists (e.g. McFarland, 1981) and behaviour-based
roboticists (e.g. Brooks, 1986). But we can also consider the
process of life as determined by cognition and vice versa, as
the idea of autopoiesis proposes (Maturana and Varela, 1980;
1987; Stewart, 1996), in which we would be speaking about
cognition of living organisms. Here we would run into the5A Theaetetic way of measuring cognition could be
determined by counting the number of things a system knows...
debate of what is considered to be alive, but in any case we can
say that biology and artificial life have studied this type of
cognition. Artificial cognition would be the one exhibited by
systems built by us. These can be built as models of the
cognition of the living, such as an expert system, an octapod
robot, or software agents. But we can also build artificial
systems without inspiration from biology which can be
considered as cognitive (the  thermostat knows when it is too
hot or too cold). Most of these types of cognition can be
considered as adaptive cognition, since all living organisms
also adap t to modest changes in their environment, but also
many artificial and non-living systems. Cybernetics (Wiener,
1948), and more recently certain branches of artificial
intelligence and artificial life (e.g. Holland, 1992) have studied
adaptive systems. W e can contain all the previous types of
cognition under systemic cognition. Complex systems (Bar-
Yam, 1997), and general systems theory (Turchin, 1977) can
be said to have studied this type of cognition. We cannot think
of a more general type of cognition because something needs
to exhibit this cognition, and that something can always be
seen as a system. We can see a graphical representation of
these types of cognition in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Different types of cognition.
It is curious that cognitions which are considered to be
simpler contain the ones considered to be more complex. It
seems that this is because when we speak for example about
human cognition, we do not see humans as a  system, and when
we speak for example about cognition in living organisms, we
do not think right away about human cognition. W e should
also note that all types of cognition can be studied at different
levels and from different approaches.
This is only one way of categorizing different types of
cognition, but there can be several others.  One could be by
measuring the statistical correlations between the “inputs” and
the “outputs” of a cognitive system (if we can identify them).
If the outputs can be obtained by pure statistical correlations,
then the cognition is simpler than if it requires complex
transformation or re-representation of the inputs (Clark and
Thornton, 1997; Thornton, 2000). The more transformation the
inputs require, the higher and  more complex the cognition
would have to be. So for example a rock would have low
cognition, because if it is on the ground (input), it will stay
there (output), and if it is on the air (input), it will fall (output).
Now try to do the same predictions/descriptions with a cat, and
we can see that they have higher cognition. This categorization
is also not universal, but it seems to be useful in several
contexts, rather than in a single one.
6. Conclusions
In classical cognitive science, it seems that there was the
common belief that human cognition was a symbol system
(Newell, 1990). W e believe that the confusion was the
following: human cognition can be modelled by symbol
systems (at a certain level), but this does not mean that human
cognition (absolutely) is a symbol system. But the same
applies to all models. Human cognition (absolutely) is not a
parallel distributed processor, nor any other model which we
can think about. Things do  not depend on the models we have
of them. And that some aspects of cognition (e.g. navigation)
are implemented more easily under a certain paradigm, does
not mean that natural cognitive  systems do it the same way.
Artificial cognitive systems are not cognitive just because
they implement a specific architecture. Of course different
architectures can be more parsimonious, others more
explanatory, others easier to  implement, etc.; but this is
dependent of the context in which we are  modelling, and  only
in a specific context they can be judged to be cognitive.
Different cognitive models and paradigms can be said to
be modelling different aspects of cognition. They are different
metaphors, with different goals and from different contexts.
Therefore, we will have a less-incomplete view of cognition if
we take into account as many paradigms as possible.
There have been several proposed definitions of
cognition, in different contexts. We proposed a notion which
is applicable to all of these contexts and possibly more and
encompasses them (although this makes it less practical).
A human doing the same things a simple robot does would
be considered cognitive, just because her/his behaviour would
be described with different terminology. But if the observed
processes are the same, we believe that there is no intrinsic
cognitive difference related to a specific task between two
different systems (i.e. functional not material) if they solve the
same task in the same context with the same success. This is
very similar to Turing’s (1950) test for intelligence, only that
limited to a context, rather than comparing machines with
humans in general. This is why we say that cognition is
observed. Just as a brain needs a body and an environment
(Clark, 1997), a cognitive system also needs an observer.
Someone could say that “real” cognition is given when a
system (such as a mature human) is able to explain and
understand, and that we are the ones describing other systems,
thus gifting them with cognition. We would agree, but even go
further: we are  the ones describing our own cognition, along
with that of any cognitive system. Our cognition does not
depend only on our nature, but also on how we
<observe|describe> it.
In different contexts, different systems can be judged as
cognitive or not, but how we judge them does not change the
system, only our description. But contemplating as many
systems as cognitive can only enhance our understanding of
what cognition is.
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